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Summary 
THIS ARTICLE outlines the current beef price structure in Zimbabwe, as affected by 
government interventions, and attempts to estimate the quantitative response of domestic 
producers and consumers to changes in beef prices. A brief overview of the country's livestock 
and beef production sectors is given, the trends in beef consumption and the nature of the 
government pricing policy towards domestic producers are discussed, and initial estimates 
made of the aggregate demand for beef. The producers' price structure is analysed vis-à-vis 
world prices, and aggregate supply response parameters, international price transmission 
relationships, and the beef grading scheme used by the CSC are discussed. 
Introduction 
Prices guide producers and consumers in allocating their resources, the most common 
objectives being to maximise profits and consumption preferences, respectively. 
However, price adjustments are seldom free from government interference. The main reasons 
behind the active involvement of governments in the pricing process are: 
 Equity considerations (e.g. since incomes are not usually distributed equally among 
consumers, the ability of low-income families to purchase a particular commodity will be 
curtailed if prices increase within a laissez-faire environment); 
 Lumpiness' of costs or benefits of a particular economic enterprise (e.g. it is difficult to 
put a value on the benefits of pollution control within the market process because they 
do not accrue directly to a single individual or entity); 
 Protection of the domestic economy against severe fluctuations on the international 
markets; and 
 Political considerations (e.g. lobby groups often put pressure on governments to 
maintain a particular pricing policy in order to preserve their vested interests). 
Governments participate directly in the pricing process by granting subsidies to producers or 
consumers for certain commodities, by imposing import tariffs or quotas and domestic sales 
taxes, and by establishing regulatory government bodies such as agricultural marketing boards. 
In Zimbabwe, active government involvement in beef pricing policy dates back to 1927, when a 
surplus of cattle in the domestic market prompted the government to enter into an export 
agreement with Imperial Cold Storage of Cape Town. The domestic counterpart in this contract 
was the Rhodesian Cold Storage and Supply Ltd, which was a private company. The 1927 
export agreement included two important provisions: it provided a government subsidy to the 
Rhodesian company and it gave the government the right to expropriate the company after 10 
years. 
The government took over management and ownership of Rhodesian Cold Storage and Supply 
Ltd in 1937. The company became known as the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) and 
established slaughter and cold store plants in Salisbury (1943), Umtali (1946), Fort Victoria 
(1951), Gatooma (1970), Marandellas (1975), Sinoia (1976), Que Que (1946) and Gwelo 
(1947). The cold stores in Que Que and Gwelo were relatively small but a major cold store 
complex was built in Gwelo in 1976. 
The objectives of the CSC were to attain self-sufficiency in beef products and to generate 
foreign exchange earnings from the beef sector. 
In 1967, the CSC was placed under the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA). The AMA 
conducts initial hearings with farmers' associations with respect to determining beef producer 
price levels. 
The CSC monitors and controls domestic beef prices in Zimbabwe. The producers' prices are 
set by the Commission on the basis of production costs incurred within alternative commercial 
beef production systems. The cost data are supplied partly by the Commercial Farmers' Union 
(CFU) and partly by the Ministry of Agriculture. Both sources rely on case studies of farming 
units to generate their statistics on the cost of production. 
The consumer price is normally set below the domestic producer price. As a result, the CSC has 
substantial trade deficits which are financed by the government. 
The first section of this article gives an outline of the livestock and beef production structure in 
Zimbabwe. The second section presents trends in beef consumption, initial estimates of 
aggregate demand for beef, and the nature of the government's pricing policy towards domestic 
consumers. The third section gives the producers' price structure vis à vis the world market, 
aggregate supply response parameters, international price transmission relationships and a 
discussion of the beef grading scheme. 
The Zimbabwe livestock sector 
The livestock sector in Zimbabwe has always played a vital role in the economy, providing food, 
generating export earnings or as a major source of domestic farm income, and providing 
employment. Between 1965 and 1982 livestock products, particularly beef and dairy products, 
accounted for 17 to 31 % of the total value of primary production in the large-scale commercial 
livestock sector. 
Livestock products are produced on large- and small-scale commercial farms and on peasant 
holdings in communal areas. The Central Statistical Office (CSO) defines a large-scale 
commercial unit as one having: 
 Five or more permanent employees; or 
 Twenty-five or more hectares under crops; or 
 Three hundred and fifty head or more of livestock (cattle, sheep, goats and pigs). 
Both large- and small-scale commercial units use modern farm technologies. Smallholders use 
less sophisticated technologies and consume a large proportion of their produce on the farm. 
Labour on smallholdings is usually supplied by family members. 
A significant difference also exists between the numbers of small ruminant stock held in 
commercial farming areas and on communal lands. CSO statistics indicate that the number of 
goats. in the communal areas increased from 579 000 head in 1964 to 1 013 000 head in 1983, 
while the number of goats held on commercial farms fell from 76 000 head in 1970 to 29 000 in 
1983. 
The number of cattle held on large farms increased between 1920–30 and 1965–77 (Table 1). 
Table 1. Increase in cattle population on large-scale commercial farms, 1920–30 to 1977–81. 
Period 









The marked decline between 1977 and 1981 can be attributed to the drought in 1979 and the 
worsening security situation in the country. The herds in communal areas increased by 5.2% 
per annum during the period 1965–77 but showed an aggregate decline of 4% per annum 
between 1977 and 1981. 
According to CSO data (AMA, 1983) the number of beef cattle on large-scale farms increased 
by 1.5% per annum during the period 1966–83. A large part of this increase can be attributed to 
the increase of 3.62% per annum in the average herd size per farm (i.e. from 358 to 655 head). 
Over the same period the number of beef farms declined by 2.01% per annum (from 4379 to 
3070). The majority of the beef herd of the large-scale sector is in the Matabeleland, North and 
South Mashonaland and in the Midlands area. In 1983 86% of the country's total beef stock was 
in these areas. 
The changes in the herd structure of the large-scale sector between 1965 and 1983 are shown 






Table 2. Profile of the large-scale sector: Herd inventory, 1965 and 1983. 
Animal category 
No. of animals ('000 head) Annual increase 
(%) 1965 1983 
Calves 253 428 3 
Breeding females 579 760 1.5 
Other females 219 330 2.3 
Bulls 25 40 2.6 
Other males 443 453 0.1 
Source: CSO data quoted in AMA (1983). 
Although not shown in Table 2, there was a sharp decline in the number of breeding females in 
the herds from 1 028 000 head in 1976 to 733 000 in 1980 (AMA, 1983), to which both drought 
and internal security disruptions contributed. 
Between 1964/65 and 1982/83 the average slaughter rate for the large-scale sector was 14% 
(SD 4%) (AMA, 1983). In the case of small-scale farms, slaughter rates were in the range of 10 
to 15% between 1974 and 1978. On the large-scale farms the average annual mortality rate 
was 3% over the same period, while the annual average calving rate was 58% (SD 6%) 
between 1965 and 1983. 
Most slaughtering of mature cattle is done by the CSC. In 1983, for example, the CSC 
accounted for 87% of the total number of slaughterings, averaging 82% (SD 5%) over the 1965–
83 period. The balance of mature cattle slaughterings is done in CSC-licensed butcheries and 
on farms. 
Beef consumption 
Beef consumption increased from 48 050 tonnes in 1965 to 111 300 tonnes in 1983, an annual 
increase of 7% . Time-series data on aggregate beef consumption are derived from aggregate 
food balance sheets calculated by the CSO. In 1983 70% of the meat consumed in Zimbabwe 
was beef. Consumption of pig and poultry meat, which are possible substitutes for beef, 
increased by 3% and 9% per annum, respectively, from 1970 to 1982. Although consumption of 
poultry meat increased faster than beef (9 vs 7% per annum) during this period, poultry meat 
accounted for only 10% of the total meat consumption in 1983. 
The terms of trade (ratio of the retail price of the substitute to the retail price of beef) seem to be 








Table 3. Terms of trade for major meat products in the Harare area, 1973–80. 
Year Mutton/beef Pork/beef Chicken/beef 
1973 2.06 1.80 1.46 
1974 2.05 1.70 1.43 
1975 1.94 1.64 1.39 
1976 2.75 1.76 1.30 
1977 2.59 1.67 1.29 
1978 2.43 1.58 1.47 
1979 2.29 1.73 1.40 
1980 2.55 1.82 1.60 
Source: CSO data quoted in AMA (1983). 
Favourable terms of trade for beef reduce demand for the substitute products. It is difficult, 
however, to assess whether it is government policy to preserve a large share of the domestic 
meat market for beef producers, since only the retail price of mutton is not subject to 
government price control. On the other hand, part of the reason for the higher prices of pork and 
chicken relative to beef could be their higher feed costs. 
Domestic budgetary subsidies allotted to the beef sector comprise a substantial proportion of 
the total agricultural subsidy (Table 4). 
Table 4. Subsidies to the beef sector and total subsidy for the agricultural sector, Zimbabwe, 
1976/77–1981/82. 
Year 
Beef subsidy (Zimbabwe 
$'000) 
Total agricultural subsidy 
(Zimbabwe $'000) 
1976/77 6 338 9 458 
1977/78 11 265 14 483 
1978/79 20 516 42 173 
1979/80 12 920 26 302 
1980/81 9 619 50 568 
1981/82 25 730 121 650 
Source: Jansen (1982). 
To examine the economic aspects of the beef subsidy, the domestic retail price for beef was 
compared with the border price equivalent of beef (i.e. CIF beef import price). If the domestic 
retail price is above (below) the border price, consumers face implicit taxes (subsidies). The 
basic data used in calculating the domestic retail price for beef and CIF beef import price was 
obtained from the CSC and AMA. The estimated price ratios are given in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5. Average domestic retail price/border price ratios for beef, Zimbabwe, 1966–69 to 
1976–81. 





As can be seen in Table 5, domestic beef consumption was subsidised until 1975, while in 
1976–81 the consumer was taxed. However, despite the insight into government policy 
regarding domestic consumer prices provided by the data in Table 5, use of these price ratios 
should be treated with caution. Firstly, the degree of under- or over-valuation of the exchange 
rate has not been considered. If the exchange rate is over-valued, the ratio will be over-stated to 
the same degree. Secondly, the marketing margin of 35% used to adjust the border price to the 
equivalent domestic level is largely determined by the CSC and may include either some 
monopoly profits or additional costs arising from possible marketing inefficiencies. 
Aggregate domestic demand for beef was estimated for the period 1970–83. In linear and log 
form (base e), the relationships are: 
 
where: qbt, is the per caput beef consumption in period t. 
Pbt is the domestic retail price of beef in period t divided by a cost of living index. 
DR is a binary variable equal to 1 in the presence of a rationing scheme and 0 otherwise. 
DW is the Durbin–Watson test. 
Numbers in parentheses in all regression equations reported in this article are standard errors of 
the corresponding regression coefficient, and all R2s have been adjusted for degrees of 
freedom. 
The fit of expressions (1) and (2) is not satisfactory. However, the price coefficients are 
statistically significant (as indicated by the t-value being approximately equal to 2), and the price 
coefficient in both expressions has the correct sign. Serial correlation problems are not serious 
since the Durbin-Watson values are close to 2. 
However, since the null hypothesis for testing the significance of an individual regression 
coefficient is that it equals zero, it is not necessarily relevant to look at the levels of significance 
of the price coefficients of demand relationships. Hence, in order to evaluate the statistical 
dispersion dimensions of the elasticity estimates generated by (1) and (2), the 95% confidence 
interval for the elasticity parameters was estimated. In the case of the linear form, wherein the 
price elasticity was estimated at the means, the method of Fieller (1944) was used to compute 
the confidence interval. 
The 95% confidence intervals of the price elasticity coefficient in absolute terms for (1) and (2), 
respectively, are: 
(a) 0.35 < 0.51 < 0.72 
(b) 0.36 < 0.48 < 1.33 
Ideally, the ‘best' confidence interval is the one with the narrowest range of values. In this 
regard, the elasticity estimate of the linear function is superior to that of the log form. 
The price elasticities mean that a 10% increase in the retail price of beef will induce a 5% 
reduction in per caput beef consumption. Conversely, a small change in per caput beef 
consumption will induce a larger change in the price of beef. 
Also, since the demand relationships are price inelastic (i.e. less than 1 in absolute terms), an 
increase in the price of beef will increase the proportion of consumers' budgets that is spent on 
beef. Since high-income groups spend almost twice as much on beef as do low-income groups, 
any increase in beef price by the government would be resisted by the former group. This 
probably explains why prices were subsidised until 1975, i.e. the high-income consumer group 
wielded substantial political power up to 1975. 
Exports comprised 44 to 68% of total beef sales between 1965 and 1979. Exports of beef (both 
frozen and canned) comprised 50 to 93% of the total value of meat products exported between 
1970 and 1981. Prior to 1978, most of the exports were destined for South Africa. By 1980, beef 
exports had declined sharply. Political instability in 1977–79 led to the deterioration of veterinary 
field services and destruction of dipping facilities. This resulted in a significant reduction in the 
domestic supply of beef, and less beef of export quality being available. As a result, beef was 
rationed during the period 1979–1981. 
Pricing policy towards beef producers 
As shown earlier, the CSC is the main body controlling prices paid to domestic beef producers. 
Most cattle are slaughtered by the CSC, and the CSC's carcass grading scheme is the basis for 
payments to producers. In general, pricing cattle on the basis of carcass and grade has the 
following advantages: 
 Pricing can be based on the characteristics of the animal. As such, consumers (both 
domestic and foreign) are assured of a wide variety of easily identifiable beef products of 
different qualities with corresponding prices. 
 It eliminates marketing costs which could arise from differences in the information that is 
available to the producer and marketing agent. Selling livestock on a liveweight basis 
involves a lot of information on the animals' traits that can be known only to the producer 
or the marketing agent at the time of purchase. This information is usually measured 
subjectively and generated through familiarity of the producer or marketing agent with 
the animals concerned. 
A carcass grading system must be accurate, objective and feasible. To meet the first two 
criteria, the CSC introduced a grading system in July 1977 under which carcasses were 
grouped according to age, flesh development (based on length to weight ratios), and fat cover. 
Prices paid were based on the various quality combinations. 
However, despite the detailed quality specifications embodied in the 1977 document, there were 
still some grey areas within the grading policy. Van Vliet (1982), using the 1981/82 price 
schedule, illustrated that the price difference between two similar carcasses could be as much 
as 44%. As a result, the flesh-class component of the 1981/ 82 pricing schedule was further 
subdivided into very narrow intervals to minimise ambiguity with respect to such quality. 
While it is accepted that the carcass grading policy will impose a price penalty on poor-quality 
beef cattle, it will favour commercial beef producers since they have the resources to be able to 
adopt the technology needed to produce good-quality cattle. 
A government pricing policy aimed at generating surpluses for export in the long run will be 
targeted at the farm sector that is most sensitive to price changes. To examine this an empirical 
analysis of the response to changes in supply price was undertaken for the commercial and 
communal farm sectors in Zimbabwe. 
The beef supply relationship for commercial producers was estimated through an Almon model 
(a finite expectation relationship) since it gave better fit and statistical significance of regression 
coefficients than the alternative lag models considered (e.g. Fisher, Koyck, Pascal). An end-
point constraint was imposed to set a terminal point for the impact of the price variables. 
The empirical estimate of the Almon lag model is: 
 
To detect the presence of collinearity among the independent variables in equation (3), 
Eigenvalues corresponding to orthogonally transformed vectors of Vt1, Vt2 and t were computed. 
As an operational rule, an Eigenvalue between 0.1 and 0.3 indicates moderate multicollinearity; 
a value of less than 0.1 indicates high multicollinearity. The Eigenvalues corresponding to C' 
(Vt1, Vt2, t)' (Vt1, Vt2, t) C (where C is an orthogonal vector) are 2.87, 0.004, and 0.13. 
Multicollinearity is generated by the inclusion of Vt2 in equation (3). To minimise the degree of 
multicollinearity and specification errors, ridge regression was used to re-estimate equation (3). 
Ridge regression gives biased regression coefficients but efficient estimators. Details of the 
ridge methodology are given in Rodriguez (1984). A ridge estimate of equation (3) at the ridge 
scalar of 0.0001 is: 
 
The ridge estimation process reduced the sum of the variance inflation factors of the regression 
parameters by 77% . 
The price elasticities were derived from equations (3) and (4) by re-expressing Vt1 and Vt2 in 
terms of the original price variables. The resulting price elasticity estimated at the means ranged 
from –0.49 to –0.61. In terms of sign, the elasticities obtained are consistent with economic 
theory, since if producers expect prices to increase they will hold back animals from slaughter 
because they need a larger herd to increase their slaughter offtake levels. The absolute 
magnitudes of the elasticities are comparable to those obtained elsewhere, e.g. Brazil (–0.113 
to –0.575); Argentina (–0.668 to –0.962); and Colombia (–0.058 to –1.20). 
For communal farmers, the empirical beef supply function is: (5) log Mt equals 
 
where: The log transformation is to the base e. 
M is the total number of cattle sold at official auctions in the communal farming areas in 
period t. 
D is a binary variable representing the presence of drought conditions (equal to 1 for the 
years 1968, 1970, 1979, 1982 and 1983, and 0 otherwise). 
W is a binary variable for the internal security situation (equal to 1 for the years 1978 and 
1979 and 0 otherwise). 
The period of fit for equation (5) is 1965–83. The equation is the reduced form of the logarithmic 
Koyck lag model. This framework assumes that weights attached to prices by communal 
farmers decline geometrically with the age of the price information. Equation (5) gives 
acceptable statistical values of R2, DW, and standard errors of the regression coefficients. 
Equation (5) gives a short-run price elasticity of –0.34, which is much lower than that obtained 
for commercial farmers and lower than previous estimates of –1.05 in Swaziland (Doran et al, 
1979) and 1.10 to 1.15 in Sudan (Khalifa and Simpson, 1972). The estimates for Sudan and 
Swaziland are extremely high because the endogenous variable used in their supply 
relationships is not a pure representation of sales of beef from peasant farms but also includes 
sales of commercial private farmers and beef sales at premium markets. 
Nevertheless, if the response of the commercial producers to a price change is 44 to 79% larger 
than that of communal farmers, then any factor in the government's price policy that encourages 
increased production will be in favour of commercial farmers. 
The supply price elasticities estimated for the Zimbabwe domestic beef producers also have the 
following implications: 
 In the short run, an increase in the price paid to domestic producers will result in fewer 
animals being slaughtered. Coupled with increasing demand for beef, this will result in a 
smaller surplus of beef for export which would reduce the foreign exchange earnings of 
the beef sector in the short run. 
 A higher producer price will induce an increase in cattle inventories. Larger numbers of 
cattle will require an increase in the usage of domestic resources such as land, labour, 
coarse grains, etc. If the increase in the cattle activity reduces resources available to 
crop activities in which Zimbabwe enjoys a comparative advantage, then the producer 
price will incur an efficiency cost. On the other hand, if the increase in the cattle 
population increases consumption of crop byproducts which have zero opportunity costs, 
then some indirect benefits will be realized. 
An index which can be used to monitor the ex-post impact of a given price policy is the nominal 
protection coefficient (NPC): 
(6) NPC = Pd/Pw 
where: Pd is the domestic producer price. 
Pw is the border price. 
In the case of beef, the border price is defined as: 
(7) Pw. = rPX – N + R 
where: r is the nominal exchange rate. 
Px is the border price in foreign currency per kg. 
N is the marketing margin. 
R is the revenue from cattle byproducts. 
If the NPC is greater or less than 1, then the domestic producer is subsidised or taxed. 
The nominal rates of protection for beef are given in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6. Nominal rate of protection of the beef sector in Zimbabwe, 1965–69 to 1975–82. 
Assumptions 1965–69 1970–74 1975–82 
NPC1 1.14(0.08) 1.25(0.10) 1.64(0.20) 
NPC2 0.98(0.06) 1.07(0.09) 1.40(0.16) 
NPC3 0.91(0.06) 1.00(0.08) 1.32(0.16) 
NPC4 0.85 (0.06) 0.92 (0.07) 1.22 (0.15) 
Notes: 
1. The assumed marketing margins are 40% (NPC1) and 30% (NPC2, NPC3, NPC4). 
2. The assumed proportions of revenue contribution from offals and hides are 25% (NPC1 and 
NPC2); 30% (NPC3); and 35% (NPC4). 
The NPC was averaged for each of the three subperiods. It was also estimated under various 
marketing margins and proportions of revenue from byproducts. Comparison of the various 
NPCs under varying assumptions with respect to N and R indicates: 
 Increasing N by 25% increases NPC by 17%. 
 Increasing R by 17% leads to NPC being understated by 8% . 
It is evident from Table 6 that beef producers in Zimbabwe were increasingly subsidised from 
1965 to 1982. If estimates that subsidies on beef consumption are declining are correct, then 
the trend in the NPCs implies that the government is trying to increase rural incomes (mostly of 
commercial farmers) at the expense of urban beef consumers. 
This paper also examines the extent to which the government's beef pricing policy in Zimbabwe 
allows the domestic beef market to be exposed to international market conditions. If the 
government does not insulate the domestic market from price changes on the international 
market, then the international beef price cycles would be experienced by domestic beef 
producers. In other words, in periods of high international beef prices, the number of animals 
slaughtered by domestic producers would decline, resulting in fewer exports of beef from 
Zimbabwe. 
The degree to which the Zimbabwe beef market is insulated from the international market was 
examined using equation (8): 
 
If b = 0, livestock producers' prices are completely insulated from changes in the international 
market price of beef. It can also be proven that as b approaches 0, substantial variations in the 
NPC occur. This results in variations in the implicit subsidies to or taxes on domestic beef 
producers. Substantial changes in the price incentive structure confronting domestic beef 
producers will induce variations in production (an ‘unwelcome' instability). 
The empirical estimate of equation (8) for the period 1965–82 is: 
(9) P  = 15.64 + 0.77P  1.02t 
(0.12) (0.57) 
R2 = 0.89 DW = 1.28 
where: Pd and Pw are in cents per kg of ‘bone-in' beef of average quality. 
The fit for (9) is reasonable, as indicated by the R2. There was no significant autocorrelation at 
the 5% level. The coefficient of Pw*, is also statistically significant with its t-value (6.41) being 
greater than 2. Thus, the magnitudes of the coefficients in equation (9) (when b 0) indicate that 
the government permits the price paid to domestic producers to respond to changes in 
international market conditions. 
Summary and conclusions 
Governments intervene in the pricing process in an economy for a number of reasons, including 
externalities, equity considerations and political pressure from lobby groups, which are closely 
related to one another. The price policies are effected through subsidies, tariffs, government-
owned bodies, and economic licensing requirements. 
In Zimbabwe, government pricing policy in the beef sector is implemented through the CSC. 
The government's pricing policies since the 1920s have been oriented towards attaining self-
sufficiency in beef production and realizing beef export earnings. 
The objectives of this study were to describe the price structure resulting from the government's 
intervention and to quantify the response of domestic beef producers and consumers to 
changes in beef prices. 
The major empirical findings are that: 
 The government's pricing policy tends to be producer-oriented, as indicated by the trend 
of increasing nominal protection coefficients for the period 1965–82 coupled with the 
pattern of declining subsidies to domestic beef consumers from 1966 to 1975 and the 
subsequent taxation of domestic beef consumption from 1976 to 1981. The latter fact 
reflects the decline of the political influence of the high-income urban dwellers. 
 The absolute magnitude of the supply price elasticity parameter for commercial beef 
producers is 44 to 79% higher than that obtained for communal farmers. Hence, if the 
objective of the pricing policy is to generate a surplus of beef for export, then the 
corresponding benefits arising from this will accrue largely to commercial beef 
producers., 
 The domestic demand for beef is price inelastic (with a value of –0.48 to –0.51). This 
implies that a slight change in per caput consumption of beef will exert pressures on the 
government to permit a more than proportionate change in the retail price of beef. 
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